Abstract -
INTRODUCTION
T he U.S. capital cost recovery system has remained largely unchanged since 1986. Moreover, it is based on an asset classification system that dates to 1962 and was last modified in 1981. Since 1981 entirely new industries have developed, and manufacturing processes in traditional industries have changed dramatically. Because the current system is dated, some have recently called for its modification. In response to these concerns, Congress has directed that the Treasury study the system's recovery periods and depreciation methods.
1 This paper is derived from the preliminary staff work for the forthcoming Treasury Study. 2 Following this introduction, the paper briefly discusses the rationale for a depreciation allowance under an income tax. It next describes the current cost recovery or depreciation system. Using the cost of capital, the fourth section evaluates current law's depreciation system relative to the standard of economic depreciation. The fifth section discusses several comprehensive reforms of the current cost recovery system, and illustrates the effects of these reforms on investment incentives using the cost of capital. The final section discusses several practical problems with the current depreciation system.
DEPRECIATION AND INCOME MEASUREMENT
A tax system based on income generally does not allow a deduction for the cost of a new asset in the year the asset is purchased. Instead, it spreads out the deduction over an estimate of the asset's useful lifetime. The amount allowed as an annual deduction reflects (however roughly) the reduction in the value of the capital asset as it ages, and is called depreciation.
A depreciation deduction is justified under the standard provided by economic income (i.e., Haig-Simmons income). Economic income is a measure of the change in a household's real economic well-being occurring over some time period, typically taken to be one year. It is the household's change in wealth, measured before consumption purchases (Goode, 1977) . Changes, up or down, in the value of its capital assets are part of a household's overall change in wealth, and are included in economic income. A tax based on economic income must allow a deduction when assets fall in value. 3 Economic depreciation generally is defined as the pure effect of aging on asset value Wykoff, 1981, 1996; Fraumeni, 1997) , isolated from other factors that might affect asset values over the course of a year. Gravelle (1979 Gravelle ( , 1994 emphasizes that economic depreciation should reflect the expected decline in an asset's value, as opposed to the decline actually observed, 4 but not all authors highlight this distinction. An asset may depreciate for several reasons. One reason for depreciation is that as an asset ages, it has a progressively shorter future life over which it can earn income. Thus, the present value of the asset's future income stream, which determines its value, falls as the asset ages. A second reason is that as it ages, the asset may require more expensive maintenance or become less productive. Obsolescence sometimes also is considered to be a third reason for economic depreciation, but there appears to be some ambiguity on this point. 5 Other factors that might change an asset's value over the course of a year are called revaluations. Revaluations include the effects of that estimates economic depreciation, however, seems to view obsolescence as a revaluation effect, as most clearly stated by Fraumeni (1997) and echoed by Hulten and Wykoff (1981) . There is, however, ambiguity on this point within economic depreciation literature, as Wykoff (1979 and , , and Taubman and Rasche (1969) argue that obsolescence is a reason for depreciation as distinct from revaluation. It is not clear, however, that resolving the issue of whether obsolescence induced declines in an asset's value are properly considered to be a component of "economic" depreciation as conceived in the empirical literature is crucial to determining their tax treatment. From the perspective of an accrual-based income tax, the distinction between depreciation and revaluation is meaningless. All that matters for income measurement is the net change in the asset's real value. The overall change in real value should be taxed as it accrues, regardless of whether one wishes to label part of it depreciation and part revaluation. Indeed, in his influential 1964 paper, Samuleson (1964) defines economic depreciation as the decline in the value of an asset over time without distinguishing the cause of the decline. His view is that depreciation is the negative side of the coin that has capital gain as its positive side. From the perspective of a realization based tax system the depreciation/ revaluation distinction may be important, but it is not clear how obsolescence should be treated. One might argue, as Gravelle (1979 Gravelle ( , 1994 seems to, that a normal allowance for depreciation might properly reflect anticipated changes in asset values, presumably including anticipated obsolescence. Unanticipated changes in asset value (including changes due to unanticipated obsolescence) might be sensibly treated as capital gains (i.e., as revaluation effects), and taxed when realized. changes in the relative price of an asset caused by changes in tastes and by some types of obsolescence. Economic depreciation is one important reason for an asset to fall in value over the course of a year. Proper calculation of economic income thus requires a depreciation deduction.
Inflation can increase nominal values without increasing real economic well being. It is important that inflation's effects be removed when measuring real economic income. When there is inflation, depreciation allowances must increase in proportion to the increase in the general price level. Otherwise the real value of depreciation allowances will decline over time, causing over-taxation of real economic income (Aaron, 1976; Gravelle, 1994) . Such inflation adjustments are called "indexing." Gravelle (1979) notes that economic depreciation has three important characteristics. First, it allows the investor to recover his initial investment tax free while applying the statutory tax rate to the return from that investment. This implies that granting tax allowances based on economic depreciation will tax capital income at the level implied by the statutory tax rate. 6 Second, if reinvested, economic depreciation allows the taxpayer to maintain the initial value of his investment. 7 Third, economic depreciation (at least as she defines it) measures the expected decline in the real market value of the asset as it ages.
CAPITAL COST RECOVERY UNDER CURRENT LAW 8
Under current law, the cost of investment is recovered (i.e., received tax-free) in a variety of ways, depending on the particular characteristics of the investment or the investor.
Depreciation of Physical Equipment and Structures
The Modified Accelerated Cost Recovery System (MACRS) applies to most tangible depreciable property.
9 Under MACRS, depreciation deductions are not determined by measuring the actual (or expected) change in the value of each asset as it ages. Rather, depreciation deductions are specified by statute and are calculated using each asset's cost recovery period and applicable depreciation method. Depreciation deductions are based on the historical cost of the asset; they are not indexed for inflation.
10 MACRS depreciation thus deviates in fundamental ways from the concept of economic depreciation.
The MACRS cost recovery period is the length of time over which capital costs are to be recovered. Recovery periods are determined by a classification system that distinguishes assets by type, by whether they are section 1245 property or section 1250 property, and by the activities in which they are used. Based on these criteria, current law assigns assets to one of ten categories with recovery periods that range from three to 50 years in length.
11
Section 1245 property generally consists of personal property (equipment) and real property that is used as an "integral part" of a production process. Depreciable property that is not section 1245 property is classified as section 1250 property. Section 1250 property consists primarily of buildings and general purpose land improvements.
MACRS relies heavily on the concept of class life in determining an asset's recovery period.
12 Assets with shorter (longer) class lives generally are assigned shorter (longer) recovery periods. Certain assets, such as computers, office furniture, cars and trucks, and land improvements are assigned the same class life regardless of the activity in which they are used. Most investments in section 1245 property, however, are assigned a class life that depends on the activity in which they are employed. In contrast, much section 1250 property (mainly buildings) receives the same depreciation treatment regardless of the activity in which it is employed.
The depreciation method specifies how the cost of the investment is to be allocated over the recovery period. Assets with a recovery period of ten years or less may use the double declining balance method, 13 those with a 15 or 20-year recovery period may use the 150 percent declining balance method, 14 while assets with longer recovery periods use the straight-line method.
15
11 Three-year property includes property with a class life of four years or less. Also included are certain horses and certain "rent to own" consumer durable property. Five-year property generally includes property with a class life of more than four years and less than ten years. This property includes: (a) cars, (b) light and heavy general purpose trucks, (c) qualified technological equipment, (d) computer-based central office switching equipment, (e) certain research and experimentation property, (f) semi-conductor manufacturing equipment, (g) geothermal, solar and wind energy property, (h) certain biomass properties, (i) computers and peripheral equipment, and (j) office machinery. Seven-year property includes property with a class life of 10 years or more but less than 16 years. This property includes office furniture and fixtures, railroad track, and property that does not have a class life and is not otherwise classified. Ten year property is property with a class life of 16 years or more but less than 20 years. This includes vessels, barges, tugs, and single purpose agricultural and horticultural structures. Fifteen year property is property with a class life of 20 years or more but less than 25 years. It includes municipal wastewater treatment plants and telephone distribution plants and other comparable equipment used for the two-way exchange of voice, data communications, and retail motor fuels outlets. Twenty year property includes property with a class life of 25 years or more, other than certain real property with a class life of 27.5 years or more. Water utility property and municipal sewers placed in service before June 13, 1996 and farm buildings are included in this category. Twenty-five year property includes water utility property and municipal sewers placed in service after June 12, 1996. Residential rental property (e.g., apartment buildings) is assigned a 27.5 year recovery period, while other section 1250 property that does not have a class life of less than 27.5 years (e.g., commercial and industrial buildings) is called nonresidential real property and is assigned a 39-year recovery period. Railroad gradings or tunnel bores are assigned a 50-year recovery period. In addition to these ten recovery periods, MACRS specifies special recovery periods for qualified Indian Reservation Property. See CCH (1999) and Section 168 (e) of the Internal Revenue Code. 12 For each investment, this class life is listed in Rev. Proc. 87-56. 13 An exception is provided for equipment used in farming, all of which uses the 150 percent declining balance method, even if three, five or seven year property. 14 Because declining balance depreciation would never fully recovery the investment's cost, the Code specifies that taxpayers must switch to straight-line depreciation at the point that it would yield a larger deduction than that granted by declining balance depreciation. 15 To understand declining balance depreciation, it is helpful to first grasp straight-line depreciation. Straight-line depreciation gives an annual deduction equal to the product of a depreciation rate of 1/L times the historical cost of the asset, where L is the asset's recovery period. For an asset that originally cost $200 and that has a (hypothetical) 5 year recovery period, straight-line depreciation would be $40 (=(1/5)*$200) each year for five years. The declining balance method calculates depreciation each year as the product of a depreciation rate times the remaining undepreciated basis of the investment. If L is the asset's cost recovery period, the double declining balance method has a depreciation rate of 2/L. This is twice the straight-line depreciation rate, whence the "double" in double declining balance (the depreciation rate would be 1.5/L if the method were 150 percent declining balance).
Under the double declining balance method, the base against which the depreciation rate is applied falls each year to reflect the previous year's depreciation, whence "declining balance." For an asset that originally cost $200 and has a 5 year recovery period, double declining balance depreciation would be $80.00 (=(2/ 5)*$200) in the first year, $48 (=(2/5)*($200 -$80.00)) in the second year, $28.8 (=(2/5)*($200 -$80.00 -$48.00)) in the third year, and so on.
Section 1245 property (equipment) generally is assigned to one of the shorter recovery periods and receives an accelerated method. According to Treasury calculations, most new investment in section 1245 property is in the five-year and the sevenyear recovery classes and is depreciated using the 200 percent declining balance method. Section 1250 property (mainly buildings) generally is assigned to one of the longer recovery periods. Residential buildings, for example, are depreciated over 27.5 years using the straight-line method, while commercial and industrial buildings are depreciated over 39 years using the straight-line method.
Cost Recovery for Nondepreciable Assets: Inventory, Land, and Intangibles
16
The cost of inventories, land, and intangibles is not depreciated. The cost of an investment in inventory is capitalized and deducted when the associated goods are consumed in production or sold. 17 The cost of land is capitalized and deducted against sales proceeds when the asset eventually is sold.
18
Intangible assets include good will, customer bases, trademarks, copyrights, patents, and workforce quality. Firms invest in these assets through advertising, research and development, training programs and other expenses that create future goodwill and know-how essential for profitable future production. Expenditures on new (self-created) intangibles 19 generally are deducted immediately.
20

EVALUATION OF CURRENT LAW'S COST RECOVERY SYSTEM
This section addresses the issue of how the main features of the current cost recovery system affect the taxation of capital income. It focuses on: how closely current law's cost recovery allowances match allowances based on economic depreciation, how deviations from economic depreciation affect the level and distribution of taxes on capital income, and justifications for current law's deviations from economic depreciation.
Statutorily Determined Allowances Based on Time
For depreciable assets, the tax code's cost recovery allowances assume that assets wear out at a specified rate over time. This rate is independent of the actual or expected economic conditions facing each taxpayer. Thus, the tax code's depreciation allowances deviate fundamentally from the concept of economic depreciation. At best, statutory scheduler allowances could only match economic depreciation in an average sense. However, statutory scheduler allowances are much simpler for the taxpayer to comply with and for the IRS to enforce than would be 16 We do not discuss here issues related to cost recovery in certain agricultural and natural resource activities.
For a brief summary of these issues, including depletion in the extractive industries, see Gravelle (1994) . 17 There are two primary methods of inventory accounting: first in, first out (FIFO), and last in, first out (LIFO).
Under FIFO, the cost of goods sold is calculated by assuming that the oldest items of inventory (the first in) are the first to be sold (first out). Under LIFO, the costing rule assumes that the youngest items of inventory (the last in) are the first to be sold (first out). LIFO helps protect the firm from taxes on inflationary increases in the value of inventory, since the last items in inventory will be valued at current (i.e., higher) cost. FIFO offers no such protection. 18 Certain improvements to land, however, can be depreciated. 19 A firm also may acquire an intangible asset from another firm. The cost of a purchased (as opposed to a selfcreated) intangible generally is amortized over 15 years. The cost of certain intangible assets, such as advertising to secure a license, may not be recovered until the business is sold (Gann, 1997 An empirical evaluation of the current cost recovery system requires estimates of economic depreciation against which to compare the statutorily provided tax deductions. The geometric depreciation rates estimated by Hulten and Wykoff (1981) and expanded by Jorgenson and Sullivan (1981) are widely used in empirical papers dealing with capital income taxation (e.g., Auerbach, 1983; Fullerton, 1987; and Gravelle, 1994) . Literature reviews have favorably evaluated the Hulten-Wykoff depreciation rates (Fraumeni, 1997; Wykoff, 1981, 1996; Jorgenson, 1996; and Gravelle, 1999) .
However, the Hulten-Wykoff estimates have a number of serious weaknesses, 23 not the least of which is that the evolution of the economy over the past 20 years may have rendered them obsolete. Another serious problem is that most of the Hulten-Wykoff depreciation rates are based on extrapolations rather than on explicit statistical estimates derived from data on used asset prices. 24 Furthermore, these estimates are averages that relate to asset types, and do not vary according to the activity in which the asset is employed. In addition, any estimate of depreciation is necessarily backward looking, and so may not be relevant for future (perhaps expected) changes in asset values.
These problems notwithstanding, the Hulten-Wykoff rates may be the best available estimates of economic depreciation, and we use them in this study. For 35 types of depreciable assets, these rates are shown in Table 1 , column 2. Expenditures on advertising and research and development (R&D) may create intangible assets that are long-lived and depreciate as the investment ages.
25 Fullerton and Lyon (1988) suggest that central estimates for the depreciation rates for the intangible assets created by advertising and R&D are .333 and .15, respectively. Table 1 includes an average of these rates as the depreciation rate for intangibles (asset 36). Table 1 also classifies each asset under the MACRS system, based largely on that asset's average class life as reported in Jorgenson and Sullivan (1981) . 21 See the discussion below that considers a switch to economic depreciation. 22 This discussion includes results for a single rate of inflation. Because current law's depreciation allowances are not indexed for inflation, they have a higher present value the lower the inflation rate. In contrast, the present value of economic depreciation is independent of the inflation rate. The conclusions of any analysis of current law's depreciation system thus depend on the assumed inflation rate. Indeed, inflation-induced variation in the present value of current law's depreciation allowances is one problem with the current unindexed tax system. At a sufficiently high inflation rate, current law's depreciation allowances will have a smaller present value than do those based on economic depreciation for all assets. Some of these issues are discussed in the section below that considers indexing depreciation as a policy reform. 23 In addition to Wykoff's (1981 and own discussions, see Fraumeni (1996) and Gravelle (1999) on difficulties encountered in using used asset prices to measure depreciation and on controversies surrounding the Hulten-Wykoff estimates. 24 Assets for which used price data were available nonetheless represented over 50 percent total U.S. investment in producer's durable equipment and over 40 percent of total U.S. investment in nonresidential structures (Hulten and Wykoff, 1981) . 25 For example, an advertising campaign may generate higher profits over several years (an intangible asset) by cementing brand-loyalty and hence allowing higher prices. As time passes, the value of the asset may depreciate, e.g., as customers forget about the clever message and jingle used in the ads.
In order to compare each asset's economic depreciation with it's tax depreciation, Table 1 Table 1 's present value calculations suggest that tax depreciation does not accurately measure economic depreciation. By themselves, however, the present value calculations provide an incomplete measure of the effect of tax depreciation allowances on investment incentives. 27 The cost of capital offers a more complete measure of the effects of the tax system, including depreciation and statutory tax rates at the corporate and individual levels, on the decision to invest. It is the cost of capital that influences the behavior of savers and investors and that is relevant for judging the efficiency of the tax system.
The cost of capital is the pre-tax social rate of return on a barely profitable investment that covers the investment's tax cost while still leaving the investor his required after-tax rate of return (Fullerton, 1987) . A higher cost of capital reflects a greater tax burden and hence a reduced incentive to invest. Deviations in the cost of capital across investment reflect differential taxation of alternative investments.
28
The information in the cost of capital often is expressed as a marginal effective tax rate (t), which is the difference between the cost of capital (p) and the required after-tax return (s), expressed as a proportion of the cost of capital: t = (p -s)/p. The marginal effective tax rate is the tax rate that, if applied to economic income, would be equivalent in its incentive effects to the various complicated features of the actual tax code, at least insofar as these incentives relate to present values. If the tax system successfully measures and taxes economic income, then the marginal effective tax rate equals the statutory tax rate. If tax depreciation allowances are accelerated (decelerated) relative to economic depreciation, the marginal effective tax rate can fall below (rise above) the statutory tax rate. 26 This section presents results for a single inflation rate. Because current law does not index depreciation, interest or capital gains for inflation, cost of capital and effective tax rate calculations are sensitive to the assumed inflation rate. Some of these issues are addressed in the section below that discusses indexing depreciation as an reform option. 27 One problem is that the present value calculations ignore interactions between tax depreciation and other features of the tax system. For example, the tax reduction afforded by accelerated depreciation is larger the larger is the statutory tax rate and the investment incentive afforded by accelerated depreciation can be offset by other tax rules. Accelerated depreciation also might compensate for mismeasurements elsewhere in the tax system. A second problem is that present value calculations do not clearly reflect the degree to which current law's differential acceleration is inconsistent with an efficient, or neutral, income tax (as defined below), because tax neutrality does not call for equal acceleration of all depreciation allowances. When economic depreciation is geometric, as assumed in this paper, neutrality calls for greater acceleration for long-lived relative to short-lived assets. Gravelle (1979) , however, suggests that conclusions about the construction of a neutral accelerated depreciation system can depend on the pattern of economic depreciation. 28 When investments are risky, the cost of capital would reflect a risk premium. The calculations in this paper exclude risk, so that only taxes cause differences in the cost of capital across investments.
Differences in the cost of capital and marginal effective tax rate across investments may imply that the allocation of capital is inefficient, as too much capital may be attracted to low tax/low return projects.
29 Neutrality refers to the degree to which a tax system imposes the same marginal effective tax rate on alternative investments. A tax system is fully neutral, and allocationally efficient, 30 if it taxes all investments at the same marginal effective tax rate. Neutrality also can be measured using the cost of capital since differences in the cost of capital across investments reflect differential taxation. It is apparent from Table 2 that the current tax system is not fully neutral. If all corporate assets received economic depreciation, all would have a 37.5 percent marginal effective tax rate, 35 while if all corporate assets received the degree of investment incentive offered on average to the corporate sector, all would have a 32.2 percent marginal effective tax rate. Differences from these norms within the corporate sector are caused by cost recovery allowances that are on average accelerated, but offer a different degree of tax incentive for each asset.
While marginal effective tax rates vary across types of equipment, on average investment in equipment is tax favored relative to investment in other assets. Because 29 The allocation of capital is inefficient because output could be increased by shifting a dollar's worth of capital from a low marginal effective tax rate project to a high marginal effective tax rate project because the high marginal effective tax rate project offers a higher cost of capital, or social return. 30 Assuming there are no nontax distortions in the economy. 31 All cost of capital and effective tax rate calculations exclude the effects of tax credits and other special rapid amortization provisions. These can be difficult to model and in many cases may not apply at the margin. For example, the 20 percent tax credit available for qualified incremental expenditures on R&D is ignored in these calculations. This credit is left out of the calculations because its incremental nature makes it difficult to parameterize in an aggregate calculation. Including the credit would reduce the cost of capital for R&D and to a slight extent reduce the average cost of capital for the economy as a whole. The credit would have a theoretically ambiguous effect on the neutrality of the tax system since it would simultaneously increase tax distortions across assets within the business sector while reducing tax distortions between the business sector and owner-occupied housing. Regardless of its direction, the credit's effect on overall neutrality is likely to be small. 32 These calculations assume that land and inventories do not depreciate. The calculations for inventories assume that LIFO is effective in postponing indefinitely any tax on purely inflationary gains on inventory holdings. 33 Capital stocks are used as weights in constructing the averages in this and all tables. 34 The calculations in Table 2 are based on a 3 percent rate of inflation, a 3.5 percent real after-tax rate of return, and make a number of additional assumptions, as explained in the notes to that table. 35 If only corporate level taxes were considered on an equity-financed investment, economic depreciation would imply that the marginal effective tax rate would equal the 35 percent statutory corporate tax rate. The marginal effective tax rate calculation, however, includes taxes on shareholders and allows debt finance. Shareholder level taxes on corporate profits, the "double taxation" of corporate equity income, push the marginal effective tax rate above 35 percent (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 1992). The marginal effective tax rate calculation also assumes that about two-fifths of the marginal investment is financed by debt. Since the corporation can deduct interest payments, the share of the investment's income attributable to debt finance avoids the corporation income tax as well as shareholder taxes. Instead, interest is taxed only once at the lender's relative low rate. On average, the double taxation of equity dominates the deductibility of interest and the marginal effective tax rate exceeds 35 percent when tax allowances are based on economic depreciation, as illustrated in Table 3 . Source: Authors' calculations as described in the text. Notes: a The calculations assume a 3.5% real rate of return and a 3% inflation rate. They include the effects of federal income taxes at the corporate and individual levels. State and local taxes on income and property are ignored. The statutory corporate tax rate is assumed to be 35%. The Treasury Individual Tax Model is used to generate personal level tax rates of 20% on capital gains (which is reduced further to account for deferral and for tax-free step-up at death), 27% on dividends, 24% on interest income, 30% on noncorporate business income, and 23% on home mortgage interest deductions. These rates are modified where appropriate to account for tax exempt and insurance company ownership of financial assets. The calculations assume that investments are held forever and that investments are financed using roughly 2/5s debt and 3/5s equity. b The cost of capital is the real pre-tax (net of depreciation) return needed on an investment to cover its tax cost and still leave the investor his required after-tax return. c The effective tax rate is the tax wedge (the difference between the cost of capital and the after-tax return) expressed as percentage of the cost of capital. d These are capital stock weighted averages. For tangible assets, the data comes from the BEA's 1996 detailed capital stocks and from the Federal Reserve's Flow of Funds accounts, with adjustments and imputations based on the stocks used in Fullerton (1987) , and from other sources. The stock of intangibles is computed using the industry shares of intangibles in Fullerton and Lyon (1988) . Details are available from the authors. of accelerated depreciation, the 30.9 percent average marginal effective tax rate on corporate equipment is below that implied by economic depreciation, as well as below the average for the corporate sector as a whole. In contrast, depreciation penalizes investment in corporate nonresidential structures (other than public utility property). Because of relatively slow depreciation allowances, on average nonresidential buildings face a 39.0 percent marginal effective tax rate, well above the average marginal effective tax rate for the corporate sector as a whole and above the marginal effective tax rate implied by economic depreciation. Public utility property receives relatively generous cost recovery allowances, and so faces a relatively low 29.5 percent marginal effective tax rate. Land and inventories do not benefit from accelerated recovery allowances and face a 37.5 percent marginal effective tax rate. Because of expensing, intangibles face a very low 3.8 percent marginal effective tax rate.
36
Although not entirely related to depreciation, current law imposes a lower effective tax rate on noncorporate than on corporate investment and on business investment than on owner-occupied housing. The corporate/noncorporate difference reflects in large measure the double taxation of corporate equity income, compared to the single rate of tax on income earned by noncorporate investment (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 1992). Because of this tax differential, corporate investments may be inefficiently discouraged in favor of investments in the noncorporate sector. The business/owner-occupied housing tax differential reflects the exclusion from taxable income of implicit rents from investment in owner-occupied housing. 37 This tax differential may inefficiently discourage business investment in favor of investment in owner-occupied housing.
Overall, the weighted average marginal effective tax rate for the economy is 21.5 percent, which is a combination of a high tax rate on income from corporate capital (32.2 percent), a medium tax rate on income noncorporate capital (20.8 percent), and a low tax rate (8.8 percent) on income from owner-occupied housing.
Rationales for Accelerated Depreciation 38
Current law's cost recovery provisions do not accurately measure economic income. This mismeasurement contributes to effective tax rates that generally are below statutory tax rates 39 and that vary inefficiently across investments. Nonetheless, not all economists agree that the current variation in marginal effective tax rates within the business sector is large enough to imply serious resource misallocations (Auerbach, 1996) . Furthermore, accelerated recovery allowances offer several benefits that must be weighed against their costs in assessing the overall performance of the current cost recovery regime.
Promote Efficient Levels of Saving and Investing
There is no over-arching norm that requires capital income to be taxed at the same rate as labor income, or at the statu- 36 The marginal effective tax rate is positive because expensing only removes the corporate level tax. Shareholder level taxes still affect the marginal investment. 37 The positive (rather than zero) effective tax rate on owner-occupied housing reflects the assumption that only about one-half of homeowners itemize and so deduct mortgage interest on the two-fifths of the house's price financed with a mortgage. 38 This discussion neglects two issues that might be relevant. First, accelerated depreciation has been justified as a proxy for inflation indexing. This is discussed below in the section on inflation indexing. Second, accelerated depreciation has been justified as a macroeconomic stimulus. This rationale seems irrelevant in the current economic expansion, and is questionable in any event (Gravelle, 1994) . 39 Noncorporate capital income is taxed at a rate below the average of the statutory tax rate of 30.0 percent on profits and 22.1 percent on interest.
tory tax rate. Indeed, by taxing the return to capital, an income tax may inefficiently discourage saving and investing (Auerbach, 1996; Engen and Gale, 1996; Feldstein, 1981a) . Accelerated depreciation is one way to reduce the marginal effective tax rate on capital income, and so to encourage a more efficient level of saving and investing. There is not universal agreement, however, that capital income taxes are an important deterrent to investment and saving (Gravelle, 1994; Chirinko, 1986; Hassett and Hubbard, 1996; Slemrod, 1992) .
Reduce Other Tax Distortions
Accelerated depreciation may help reduce tax distortions arising from other features of the current income tax system. To the extent that corporate industries are relatively heavy users of tax favored assets, accelerated depreciation helps reduce some of the tax distortions caused by the double-taxation of corporate, relative to noncorporate, equity income. By lowering the effective tax rate on business investment in plant and equipment, accelerated depreciation also helps reduce owner-occupied housing's tax advantage.
Correct Externalities
Sometimes a uniform effective tax rate is an inappropriate tax policy goal. Some investments may generate benefits to society at large. To the extent that the private investor cannot charge for these "positive externalities," such investments will be under-provided by the market. Relatively low taxes on such investments may help to encourage their supply, and help correct this "market failure." 40 R&D is an example of an investment that may be under-supplied by the private market because the supplier is unable to fully capture the benefits of his investment. Tax incentives, however, may not be the best way to encourage investment in R&D (Gravelle, 1994 ; and sources cited therein).
Spur Economic Growth 41
Subsidies also can be rationalized on the grounds that some types of investment may spur economic growth. Attention is sometimes focused on equipment, which some studies purport to show has a very high social rate of return. (e.g., DeLong and Summers, 1991) . The argument that investment spurs economic growth, however, is controversial (Auerbach, et al., 1992; Solow, 1994) .
Ease Tax Administration
Administrative reasons may support some of the acceleration of cost recovery allowances seen under current law. For example, accurately separating expenditures for R&D from other types of spending may be difficult, as may be dividing R&D spending between that which creates a useful asset and that which does not. Even if spending on intangible capital can be identified and capitalized, determining an appropriate recovery period and method may be difficult, since less is known about the depreciation of intangibles than about the depreciation of tangible assets (Gravelle, 1994; Gann, 1997) .
COMPREHENSIVE REFORM BASED ON AN INCOME TAX MODEL
This section discusses four issues related to the comprehensive overhaul of the depreciation system: switching to economic depreciation, indexing depreciation for inflation, tying tax depreciation 40 Other investments may impose "external costs," and so may be over-provided by the market. Investments that generate external costs should face relatively high tax burdens. 41 The growth rationale actually is a type of market failure or externality rationale. The idea is that investment should be subsidized because the private investor does not reap its full reward, some of which accrues to others in a way that promotes general economic growth.
to book depreciation, and placing depreciation on a facts and circumstances basis.
Switch to Economic Depreciation
Difficulties in Implementing a System Based on Economic Depreciation
There are two ways to move towards a system based on economic depreciation. The first would require all assets to be revalued (marked-to-market) each year. This approach offers the possibility of measuring income correctly for each investment. 42 As a practical matter, however, mark-to-market depreciation faces two serious problems. The first problem is that it would measure the total change in the asset's real value, including both depreciation and revaluation. Mark-tomarket would thus represent a big step towards full accrual taxation of real capital gains, and so would represent much more than depreciation reform. It may be difficult to use a mark-to-market technique to measure only depreciation, while continuing to use realization principles to tax gains and losses on depreciable property; separating the observed change in the asset's price into depreciation and revaluation may be difficult. If the separation were not made, depreciable assets would be taxed on an accrual basis while other assets would be taxed on a realization basis. This may be both inequitable and inefficient.
The second problem is that there is no easy way to value assets each year. There are few active markets in productive assets, so that data on the prices of many used assets are not available. In addition, even where markets exist, problems created by transaction costs, informational asymmetries, vintage effects, and firm and asset-specific characteristics may make it difficult to infer depreciation from observed prices. Other methods of valuation may not be desirable either. For example, independent appraisals are costly, of dubious quality, and are likely to be contested by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Separating expected from observed changes in value also may be difficult, and is necessary to the extent that depreciation is to reflect anticipated changes in the value of the asset. Determining what is being valued, e.g., individual assets or collections of assets (firms), and what value concept to employ, e.g., breakup value or going concern value, also can raise difficulties.
A second approach to implementing economic depreciation would maintain scheduler deductions, but would base these deductions on empirical estimates of economic depreciation. This approach does not offer the possibility of getting depreciation exactly right for any particular individual investment. It does, however, represent a feasible approach to implementing tax depreciation deductions that might approximate economic depreciation on average. Nonetheless, this approach also suffers from serious problems.
The largest problem is that we do not know with certainty what economic depreciation rates should be, even on average for aggregated classes of investments. While there are many estimates of economic depreciation, these estimates are inexact and dated. 43 Because of these problems, comprehensive depreciation reform might require substantial new empirical work. New work, however, is likely to face many of the problems that plague existing estimates of economic depreciation. Because of such problems, whether a system based on existing or 42 If asset bases are equated with market values at the end of each taxable year, and the inflation indexed change in value taken as a gain or loss, then marking-to-market properly measures economic income, at least in an ex-post sense. 43 See the above discussion of the Hulten-Wykoff depreciation rates. new estimates of economic depreciation would represent an improvement over current law is a matter of judgement rather than of fact.
Effects on the Cost of Capital and Effective Tax Rate
Setting aside these issues, we can use cost of capital/effective tax rate calculations to illustrate the effect on investment incentives of a switch to economic depreciation. These calculations assume that the Hulten-Wykoff estimates adequately measure economic depreciation and are shown in Table 3 . The table includes calculations based on current law, a proposal to switch to economic depreciation for each depreciable asset, and a proposal to switch to economic depreciation for both depreciable assets and intangibles.
Because on average economic depreciation is slower than current tax depreciation (at the assumed 3 percent inflation rate), switching to economic depreciation would slightly raise the effective tax rate for business investment, and thus for the economy as a whole. The proposal to grant economic depreciation for all assets, for example, would raise the economy wide average marginal effective tax rate by 3.5 percentage points.
Switching to economic depreciation often is justified as a way to further the goal of tax neutrality. Nevertheless, the calculations in Table 3 suggest that providing economic depreciation would not appreciably change the uniformity with which alternative investments are taxed. The overall change in the uniformity of the tax system can be summarized by a change in the standard deviation of the cost of capital. The standard deviation of the cost of capital is a measure of the variability with which alternative investments are taxed. 44 In these calculations, if all investments were taxed at the same marginal effective tax rate, then the standard deviation of the cost of capital would be zero. Differentials in the taxation of alternative investments raise the standard deviation above zero, with the increase being larger the larger are these deviations. Under current law, the standard deviation of the cost of capital is 0.0075. Switching to economic depreciation for depreciable property would give a 0.0079 standard deviation, and switching to economic depreciation for all assets would give a 0.0078 standard deviation. Thus, these calculations suggest that a switch to economic depreciation would leave relatively unchanged the uniformity of taxes on alternative investments.
Switching to economic depreciation has a small effect on overall tax neutrality because economic depreciation simultaneously increases tax differentials between some investments while reducing tax differentials between other investments. By raising marginal effective tax rates on business investment, while leaving unchanged the marginal effective tax rate on owner-occupied housing, economic depreciation moves the tax system away from neutrality at the margin of choice between investment in business capital and investment in owner-occupied housing. Economic depreciation also moves the tax system away from neutrality at the margin of choice between corporate and noncorporate investment. On a third score, however, economic depreciation improves neutrality by reducing or eliminating tax differences among assets within the corporate sector and within the noncorporate sector. Taken together, 44 The standard deviation is the square root of the sum of squared deviations from the mean. An alternative measure is the coefficient of variation, which is the standard deviation divided by the mean. The coefficient of variation gives a more accurate measure of changes in dispersion when mean values change significantly. All qualitative conclusions about the effects of tax reforms on neutrality continue to hold when tax differences are measured using the coefficient of variation in the cost of capital. All conclusions nonetheless are suggestive only, as measures of tax dispersion are not a perfect substitute for explicit calculation of efficiency costs.
these three effects roughly cancel, leaving the overall neutrality of the tax system about the same as under current law. The calculations in Table 3 are based on a relatively low, 3 percent, rate of inflation. However, because economic depreciation is indexed for inflation, while current law's depreciation deductions are not, at higher inflation rates economic depreciation can compare more favorably to current law. In other calculations we find that at an 8 percent rate of inflation, economic depreciation reduces the economy-wide average marginal effective tax rate and improves tax neutrality, relative to current law.
Revenue Effects
To the extent that tax allowances would be characterized by depreciation rates similar to those estimated by Hulten and Wykoff, a switch to economic depreciation could increase, rather than reduce, tax revenue at the current rate of inflation. This is because on average current depreciation allowances seem to be somewhat accelerated relative to economic depreciation.
Nonetheless, because economic depreciation would be indexed for inflation while the current tax system is not, this conclusion could change at a sufficiently high rate of inflation.
Grouping Assets By Economic Depreciation Rates
One way to address our ignorance about economic depreciation would be to group assets into fairly broad recovery classes based on estimates of economic depreciation rates, rather than try to assign a unique depreciation rate to each specific asset. Such a grouping might place a smaller burden on the scarce information we have about economic depreciation, while still using that information to inform tax policy. It also may be a simpler tax system than would be one that assigns a unique depreciation rate to each individual asset. National Tax Journal Vol. 53 no. 3 Part 1 (September 2000) pp. 531-562 ciation rates to aggregate assets into seven cost recovery classes. Switching from current law to something like Treasury's 1984 depreciation proposal may improve tax neutrality at some margins. However, the calculations shown in Table 3 cast doubt on such a proposal's ability to improve neutrality overall, at least at current inflation rates.
Economic Depreciation Plus Partial Expensing for Business Investment
The desire to tax economic income from business investment may conflict with the desire to offer sufficient tax incentives to save and invest. It also may conflict with the desire to tax equally income from business capital and from essentially tax-exempt owner-occupied housing. The current system of accelerated depreciation addresses these issues by reducing the tax cost of business investment in general, but it does so in an inefficient way, since accelerated depreciation contributes to varying effective tax rates within the business sector.
Combining economic depreciation with partial expensing may be a more efficient way to hold down the tax cost of business investment. The reason is that expensing a common fraction of the cost of all business investments would reduce all marginal effective tax rates equally, and so offer a uniform, neutral, investment incentive. 45 Partial expensing also could be easily tracked, limited, and adjusted as the taxpayer's situation or the general economic situation dictates. 46 Partial expensing, however, is not free from problems. One problem is that it concentrates deductions in the first year of the investment's lifetime. This may favor mature companies with substantial taxable income over start-up companies that have insufficient taxable income to fully use the tax deduction.
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Indexing Depreciation for Inflation 48
In order to properly measure income, or to ensure that the benefit of accelerated depreciation is invariant to the rate of in- 45 The cost of capital, p, often is calculated as p = (r + d)(1 -uz)/(1 -u) -d, where r is the real discount rate, d is the economic depreciation rate, u is the statutory tax rate, and z is the present discounted value of allowances for tax depreciation on a $1 investment (Fullerton, 1987) . If assets received economic depreciation then z = d/(r + d) and p = r/(1 -u). Thus, the cost of capital would be independent of the asset's durability (d), so taxes would not distort the allocation of capital between short-lived (high d) and long-lived (low d) investments. If assets received economic depreciation plus expensing of x percent of the cost of an investment, cost recovery allowances would have a present value of (1 -x)d/(r + d) + x, assuming that depreciable basis is reduced by the expensed portion of the investment's cost. Thus, the cost of capital would not vary by the asset's durability, since investments of all durabilities would have a common cost of capital given by r(1 -xu)/(1 -u). 46 In contrast to the simplicity of partial expensing, an investment tax credit must be larger for longer-lived than for shorter-lived assets in order to give a uniform tax incentive to invest. The cost of capital with economic depreciation and an investment tax credit of k percent is (1 -k)r/(1 -u) -kd, assuming that depreciable basis is reduced by the credit, and where other terms are as defined in note 45. This cost of capital is inversely related to the depreciation rate, d, so that a neutral credit must be larger for long-lived (low d) assets than for short-lived (high d) assets. Neutrality also may require that the present value of accelerated annual depreciation deductions must vary inversely with an asset's depreciation rate. See Auerbach (1983) , Bradford (1980) , and Gravelle (1979 and . 47 An investment tax credit faces the same problem. In contrast, accelerated depreciation reduces this problem by spreading deductions out over several years. Other measures, e.g., interest bearing accounts for net operating losses, also could address this problem. 48 Economic depreciation must be indexed for inflation. Thus some of the issues discussed below are also relevant for an evaluation of economic depreciation. The concern that the combination of depreciation indexing plus accelerated depreciation may lead to tax shelters and negative marginal effective tax rates does not apply with the same force to a switch to economic depreciation, however, since by definition economic depreciation is not accelerated. Nonetheless, at a sufficiently high rate of inflation the failure to index interest flows for inflation can lead to negative effective tax rates when combined with economic depreciation. See note 53 below. The revenue concern is also less of an issue if indexing were combined with economic depreciation, or with some other deceleration of depreciation deductions.
flation, depreciation allowances should rise in proportion to the inflation rate. In contrast, the current system of tax depreciation is based on the historic cost of the asset and is not adjusted, or "indexed," for inflation.
Issues in Indexing Depreciation for Inflation
Indexing depreciation offers some potential benefits. First, it helps promote tax neutrality, at least at some margins. For example, it helps prevent inflation from raising the relative tax advantage to owner-occupied housing. 49 Indexing also helps to reduce the tax advantage granted to intangibles, which are expensed, relative to depreciable business property. Second, indexing depreciation helps ensure that inflation does not inappropriately increase the overall marginal effective tax rate on capital income. Indexing thus helps maintain the desired relationship between the taxation of labor income and of capital income, and helps stop inflation from reducing the incentive to save and invest.
In the past, the interaction of high inflation with the unindexed tax system was widely viewed as a serious problem, one that potentially reduced the level of investment and distorted the choice of what assets to invest in (Henderson, 1985; Feldstein and Summers, 1979; Feldstein, 1982) . 50 Nonetheless, at today's relatively low rates of inflation, 51 indexing depreciation (and perhaps the rest of the tax system) may not seem particularly urgent. Yet, there is no guarantee that inflation will remain low, nor that a low inflation rate does not create problems for the taxation of capital income Cohen et al., 1997) . Moreover, during a low inflation period, depreciation indexing may appear to have a relatively small short-run revenue cost, making it easier to enact. While indexing depreciation for inflation is justified under an ideal income tax, and offers some potential benefits, it is not universally popular. One problem is its revenue cost; indexing can be an expensive, open-ended, tax reduction. 52 The excessive revenue cost might be addressed, however, by combining depreciation indexing with slower depreciation allowances. Some also have worried that indexing depreciation might lead to more general indexing of the tax system and thus tend to destabilize the economy (Feldstein, 1981b) , although general indexing is not necessarily destabilizing (Fischer, 1977; and Gray, 1976) . One variant of this argument worries that indexing the tax system would reduce public anti-inflation sentiment and so would pave the way for higher rates of inflation in the future .
Indexing depreciation without addressing other problems with the tax system also has been criticized (Tideman and 49 Failure to index can favor long-lived business assets (i.e., equipment) over short-lived business assets (i.e., structures) (Auerbach, 1983; and Gravelle, 1979) . For example, suppose assets receive tax allowances that are determined by the economic depreciation rate, but are unindexed. The cost of capital is given by r/(1 -u) + uyz/(1 -u), where y is the inflation rate, z = d/(r + y + d), and other terms are as defined in note 45. As can be seen by partially differentiating the cost of capital expression first with respect to y and next with respect to d, inflation raises the cost of capital more for a short-lived (big d) asset than it does for a long-lived (small d) asset. Thus, holding the real discount rate constant, failing to index depreciation discriminates against shortlived assets. Reducing this tax bias may not improve overall tax neutrality because unindexed depreciation for short-lived assets is accelerated relative to unindexed depreciation for long-lived assets over a wide range of inflation rates. 50 Not all studies have shown that inflation necessarily raises the effective tax rate or increases the variability with which alternative investments were taxed (Fullerton, 1987; Fullerton and Henderson, 1984; Henderson, 1985) . Results about the effects of inflation on effective tax rates depend on the specifics of the tax law as well as on particular modeling and parameter assumptions. 51 Based on the consumer price index, inflation ran at 2.3 percent in 1997 and at 1.6 percent in 1998. 52 Revenue cost was an important reason why (comprehensive) indexing in the Treasury's 1984 tax proposal was rejected (Perlis, 1988) . Tucker, 1976; Halperin and Steuerle, 1988; Perlis, 1988; Gravelle, 1979) . The concern is that given unindexed interest and capital gains, plus depreciation allowances that are non-neutral and accelerated at low rates of inflation, indexing depreciation would not necessarily improve the overall measurement and taxation of income. One particular concern is that indexing depreciation might increase the current tax advantage of short-lived business equipment over long-lived nonresidential structures. A second concern is that indexing can lead to negative effective tax rates, or tax shelters, when combined with debt financing. Debt finance can lead to negative marginal effective tax rates when borrowers face higher tax rates than do lenders and (a) depreciation is accelerated (Ballentine, 1988) or (b) interest flows are not indexed (Gravelle, 1994) . 53 Indexing depreciation eliminates the over-taxation of income caused by inflation's erosion in the real value of cost recovery allowances, and so increases the likelihood of a negative tax rate.
These criticisms do not necessarily carry the day. Whether indexing is likely to lead to negative effective tax rates and promote tax shelters, for example, is an empirical question that depends in part on the inflation rate. Moreover, the fundamental cause of negative marginal effective tax rates stems from the taxation of interest flows, or perhaps from accelerated depreciation, not from indexing depreciation. Equalizing tax rates on borrowers and lenders, or indexing interest flows, would seem to be more effective ways to address the problem of debt related negative tax rates. Nonetheless, these criticisms correctly point out that indexing depreciation will not necessarily improve the overall taxation of capital income in every instance.
Another potential problem is that indexing may add complexity to the tax system (Halperin and Steuerle, 1988; Feldstein, 1981b) . Part of the apparent complexity of indexing may come from the fear that every investment must, or at least should, have a separate inflation adjustment. Actually, however, a separate adjustment reflecting the change in the relative price of each asset (or even of capital generally) would be inappropriate in our realization based tax system. An adjustment for general price inflation is all that is needed. Increasing depreciation to reflect an increase in the relative price of capital allows an unrealized increase in the value of the asset to generate a tax deduction. This deduction mismeasures income and can be avoided by indexing depreciation to changes in the general price level (Gravelle, 1994) . Table 4 shows the effect at three different inflation rates of indexing current depreciation allowances. At a zero rate of 53 Ballentine's point is easiest to grasp in the case of expensing. Expensing can lead to a negative marginal effective tax rate if the borrower deducts the investment's cost at a higher rate than eventually applied to the investment's cash flow. For example, consider a two period debt financed investment that does not depreciate. On a per dollar basis, this investment has an after-tax cost of (1 -u), where u is the borrower's/investor's tax rate. If the investment earns a pre-tax rate of return of g, then in the second period the investor has taxable cash-flow of (1 + g -i), while the lender has a taxable cash flow of i, where i is the interest rate. The after-tax cash flow in total is 1 + g -u(1 + g -i) -mi, where m is the lender's tax rate. The after-tax rate of return is g -u) . When u > m the after-tax rate of return exceeds the pre-tax rate of return, i.e., the investment is subsidized or faces a negative marginal effective tax rate. Gravelle's point originates with the observation that the inflationary component of the nominal interest rate represents a return of principle. A return of principle should be neither deducted from taxable income by the borrower nor included in taxable income by the lender. When interest is not indexed, however, nominal interest is fully deductible and fully taxable. No adjustment is made to remove the inflationary component of interest from the tax base. This improper treatment can subsidize debt-financed investment if borrowers deduct the inflationary component of the nominal interest rate at a tax rate higher than that faced by lenders. inflation, indexing depreciation makes no difference. At a 3 percent rate of inflation, however, indexing depreciation generates a noticeable reduction in the cost of capital for depreciable assets; indexing depreciation reduces the (weighted) average cost of capital for corporate equipment from 5.1 percent to 4.5 percent. This corresponds to a 9 percentage point reduction in the marginal effective tax rate on income from an investment in corporate equipment. At 3 percent inflation, indexing depreciation reduces the weighted average cost of capital for the economy from 4.5 percent to 4.2 percent. Not surprisingly, at the higher 6 percent rate of inflation, indexing depreciation generates a larger relative reduction in the tax cost of investment and in the cost of capital.
Effect of Indexing Depreciation on the Cost of Capital and Effective Tax Rate
In addition to lowering the cost of capital, indexing depreciation also improves neutrality over the range of inflation rates considered in Table 4 . At a 3 percent rate of inflation, indexing depreciation reduces the standard deviation in the cost of capital from 0.0075 to 0.0059, and the reduction in the standard deviation is larger at the 6 percent rate of inflation. Indexing depreciation reduces tax differences across investments in large part by reducing the tax cost of investment in business capital relative to investment in owneroccupied housing, and by reducing the tax cost of investment in depreciable business property relative to intangibles. These improvements in tax neutrality arise, moreover, even though indexing depreciation increases the tax advantage of equipment over nonresidential structures and of depreciable property over land and inventories.
The calculations summarized in Table  4 cast some doubt on the argument that indexing will lead to negative marginal effective tax rates. Even assuming a 6 percent rate of inflation, indexing depreciation leads to no negative marginal effective tax rates on corporate investment, and only leads to negative rates on three (out of 38 possible) noncorporate investments, under our assumption that debt finances about two-fifths of the cost of investment. Higher inflation rates or higher leverage ratios are required to get substantial problems with negative effective tax rates. National Tax Journal Vol. 53 no. 3 Part 1 (September 2000) pp. 531-562
Accelerated Depreciation as a Proxy for Indexing
Accelerated depreciation has been justified as a way to index implicitly for inflation (Feldstein, 1981b; Gravelle, 1980; Aaron, 1976) . Acceleration is said to be simpler to administer than would be explicit indexing. Yet, from the perspective of income measurement, accelerated depreciation is a poor proxy for explicit indexation. Getting the adjustment right for all assets at a single inflation rate is likely to be difficult. Furthermore, even if the accelerated allowances grant the right amount of depreciation at one inflation rate, allowances will not be correct at other inflation rates. Moreover, given that indexing depreciation does not require a separate price index for each category of assets, explicitly adjusting depreciation for inflation may not be as complicated as some believe.
First Year Allowance as a Proxy for Indexing Auerbach and Jorgenson (1980) proposed an immediate write-off equal to the present value of depreciation allowances. The Auerbach-Jorgenson plan would be inflation-proof. Since the entire deduction would occur in the first year, its value would be independent of whatever inflation rate prevails over the investment's lifetime. This plan would offer a simple way to index for inflation.
Putting the entire deduction for depreciation in the first year nonetheless imposes some costs. For example, firms without sufficient tax liability would be unable to benefit fully. Thus, this proposal would be biased in favor of established firms, and may encourage mergers. Granting the full value of the deduction in the first year also may complicate ordinary income recapture provisions if the asset is sold prematurely.
The Auerbach-Jorgenson plan also may raise revenue concerns (Gravelle, 1979; . Part of the short-run revenue cost is more a matter of perception than of reality, however, because AuerbachJorgenson's reduction of tax in the first year of an investment is offset by a tax increase in the out years. Except for the cost of indexing, the Auerbach-Jorgenson plan can be designed to have no real revenue cost at all.
Switch to Financial (Book) Depreciation
Many firms have to measure income for financial reporting purposes as well as for tax purposes. Conforming tax depreciation to financial, or book, depreciation would help reduce the cost of maintaining two sets of accounts. It also could result in improved income measurement, to the extent that book depreciation gives a more accurate measurement of income than does tax depreciation, and it might reduce disputes between taxpayers and the IRS.
These benefits, however, should not be overstated. Many companies would still have to keep two sets of books, since, in addition to depreciation, there are other differences between financial and tax accounting rules (Ferris et al., 1992) . Smaller companies, moreover, may currently use tax depreciation rules for keeping their nontax accounts, or may not keep nontax accounts, and would not benefit from reduced record-keeping costs.
Using financial accounting rules to calculate tax depreciation would not necessarily improve income measurement, tax fairness, and tax administration. These are empirical questions that are difficult to answer for several reasons. First, there is no well-defined set of financial depreciation rules against which tax depreciation rules may be compared. Second, in response to tax conformity firms may elect to adopt accelerated book depreciation methods. Third, the treatment of firms that are not publicly traded and do not need to prepare audited financial state-ments raises difficulties. 54 Finally, it is unlikely that the IRS would simply accept any depreciation method adopted by the taxpayer for book purposes; disputes over depreciation would remain.
Allow Depreciation Based on Facts and Circumstances
A switch to a depreciation system based on individual taxpayer facts and circumstances offers the potential for accurate measurement of economic income. At the same time, it would place a heavy burden on taxpayers to obtain the necessary data and to use that data to justify to the IRS their depreciation deductions. It also would impose a large burden on IRS agents, since they would be required to evaluate properly the data provided by taxpayers. From a historical perspective, it is clear that this system would likely generate much controversy and litigation because of informational gaps, future uncertainties, and unsubstantiated claims and beliefs (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 1971; Brazell et al., 1989) .
The difficulty of obtaining the data needed to accurately estimate economic depreciation makes it uncertain that a facts and circumstances system would improve on current law's measurement of economic income. It is quite likely, however, that switching to a facts and circumstances basis for depreciation would increase the costs of administering and complying with the tax system.
ASSET CLASSIFICATION AND OTHER RECOVERY PERIOD ISSUES UNDER MACRS
The reforms above address depreciation problems by abandoning MACRS in favor of a fundamentally different cost recovery system. A second, alternative, type of reform seeks to improve the operation of the MACRS system, rather than to overturn MACRS in favor of another depreciation system.
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Properly classifying assets is important in order to avoid income mismeasurement that potentially favors certain activities over others. Yet one important set of problems with MACRS stems from difficulties in determining an asset's proper class life and recovery period. These problems can be fixed by working within the existing MACRS structure. In this section we discuss several classification problems and comment briefly on paths to their solution.
Some of these classification issues can be solved by piecemeal reform of MACRS. Other classification problems are more fundamental and arise because MACRS lacks a clear intellectual foundation for classifying assets. MACRS never gives an operational definition of the class life concept that supports the current assignment of recovery periods. Providing such a definition and using it to consistently classify assets raises issues of the same type and of the same degree of difficulty as those encountered in establishing an entirely new depreciation system.
Multiple Lines of Business/Dual Use Assets
Many assets receive depreciation allowances that vary depending on the industry or activity in which they are used. Consequently, classifying an asset can be difficult when a firm's activities span more than one asset class.
One set of problems in this area arises from dual use assets, assets that are employed in more than one line of business. 54 It may lead to two depreciation systems, one for publicly traded firms and one for other taxpayers. It is unlikely that the two systems would treat firms equally. 55 Indexing is included as a fundamental reform because cost recovery has always been based on historical cost.
Indexing would fundamentally abandon this principle. We concede, however, that indexing could be seen as a reform that operates within the existing MACRS structure.
In general, an asset's primary use determines its classification (Reg. 1.167(a)-11(b)(4)(iii)(b)), yet determining primary use can be difficult. This is illustrated by a recent controversy involving gas stations. Gas station buildings belong to asset class 57.1 and have a 20-year class life. This implies that their cost is recovered over 15 years using the 150 percent declining balance method. Many gas stations, however, also operate small convenience stores selling a limited selection of food, beverages, first aid items, clothing, and other sundries. Buildings used by small convenience stores have no class life and are depreciated over 39 years using the straight-line method. Given the substantial difference in the pattern of depreciation deductions afforded gas stations and convenience stores, it is important to know when a gas station becomes a convenience store. Yet IRS rulings were controversial and led to a statutory amendment in the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1993 that decided the issue in favor of a 15-year recovery period for gas station buildings.
Vertically integrated taxpayers may have difficulty classifying assets. For example, the petroleum refining industry has argued that assets used in its chemical production activities should be classified separately from those used in its refining activities. Such treatment would seem to be consistent with the primary use rule and mirrors the treatment that would be accorded a stand-alone supplier of the chemicals. Nonetheless, the IRS has disputed the industry's claim, arguing that separate classification requires that chemical production be operated as a separate business.
To some extent, classification problems like these are unavoidable. Lines have to be drawn somewhere, and cases that are close to the line will be controversial. Nonetheless, some classification problems might be addressed by broadening or narrowing asset class definitions, or by closely targeted Congressional action. Regulatory rules of thumb also may offer a solution in certain cases. For example, prior to 1971 a rule specified that only if the cost basis of assets used in a separate activity exceeds 3 percent of the taxpayer 's total basis in all property would the activity be significant enough to warrant separate classification (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 1964) . Such a rule might help solve classification disputes in vertically integrated companies.
New Assets and New Activities
New assets and new economic activities pose difficult classification problems. There is no way to easily accommodate them because Treasury has no regulatory authority to create or redefine asset classes. Treasury can only assign the property to an existing class life or place it in a default category. A more comprehensive solution requires statutory action.
The age of the current classification system adds to the severity of this problem. The existing class life system dates to the early 1960s, and in many cases reflects the tax depreciation practices of late 1950s. Nonetheless, during the past 40 years the economy has changed dramatically. New industries and assets have been developed, and production techniques have changed. The development of electronics, especially computerization and telecommunications, over this time period represents an important example of this general problem.
Ambiguity about the meaning of class lives also contributes to the problem of classifying new assets and assets used in new activities. 56 Existing law provides no 56 Definitional ambiguity also makes it difficult to evaluate claims that certain existing assets should receive a shorter class life, and hence a shorter cost recovery period.
clear definition of a class life. At least two different definitions find some support in law: anticipated useful life of that class of property to the industry or other group (Internal Revenue Code section 167(m), prior to its repeal by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990) and a straightline life equivalent in present value terms to economic depreciation (U.S. Congress, 1987) . While these definitions are similar, they are not identical. Even abstracting from differences between them, neither definition is sufficiently specified to provide clear operational guidance in determining the proper class life for a new asset.
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A satisfactory solution to these problems probably requires a comprehensive review of the existing class life system. This review would first need to establish an operational definition of class life.
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Such a definition would allow new assets and new activities to be included properly in the depreciation classification system. The class lives of existing assets also might be evaluated in light of the class life definition, and revised up or down based on appropriate empirical evidence.
However necessary it may be, such a review would be a major and difficult undertaking. It probably would involve establishing a professional office within Treasury (or perhaps within a Congressional organization) to supervise the operation and implement the changes. 59 This office would face very difficult data issues of the sort that have plagued papers in the academic literature that attempt to estimate economic depreciation rates. Some of these issues, e.g., those created for measuring economic depreciation rates by thin markets in many used assets, may be insoluble. Some issues, e.g., establishing typical useful lives, may be solved only if taxpayers are required to supply significant amounts of information to the Treasury. Political pressures also may be brought to bear on the process, and these may inhibit the office's attempt to rationalize the class life system.
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The office need not be independent of Congressional authority. For example, Congressional oversight could be provided through veto power. In addition, Congress always would have substantial implicit authority since it could seek statutory modification to any change initiated by Treasury, and could seek to repeal Treasury's authority to change class lives.
Cliffs and Plateaus
In mapping from class lives into MACRS recovery period, the current depreciation system creates cliffs that give very different cost recovery periods to assets with similar class lives. For example, the upper end of the 5-year recovery class breaks at a class life of 10 years. Thus, property assigned a class life of 9.5 years (e.g., assets used in the manufacture of chemicals and computer-based central office switching equipment) receives a 5-year recovery period, while property assigned a class life of 10.0 years (e.g., furniture and agricultural equipment) receives a 7-year recovery period. The cliff creates a two-year difference in recovery periods that greatly exceeds any difference justified by a 6-month difference in 57 For example, present value calculations vary with the discount rate, and no discount rate is provided in the second definition. 58 An alternative approach would focus on cost recovery periods, thus skipping the intermediate step involved in defining a class life. 59 The alternative of direct Congressional involvement is less appealing. The legislative process probably is too slow and too involved in the myriad of policy and political concerns to oversee effectively what are essentially technical issues. 60 Political forces quickly stripped the power to change class lives from Treasury's former Depreciation Analysis Division, which had a similar mandate (Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988). While Treasury still has the authority to study assets, this authority is of little value without the ability to implement changes.
class life. 61 Because of these cliffs, assets with class lives slightly less than the upper end of any recovery class are tax advantaged, relative to assets with a class life slightly greater than the upper end of that recovery class.
The mapping from class life to MACRS recovery period also creates plateaus on which assets with very different class lives receive the same recovery periods. For example, tobacco manufacturing assets have a 15 year class life, but are given the same 7 year recovery period as furniture and agricultural equipment, which have a 10 year class life. If class lives are correlated with economic lives, this implies a tax advantage for assets (like those used in the manufacturing of tobacco) that lie on the far end of the recovery period, relative to assets that line on the near end of the recovery period (like furniture and agricultural equipment).
These cliffs and plateaus might appear to be justified as a way to simplify depreciation accounting by restricting the number of cost recovery classes. The simplification benefit is largely illusory, however. The costs of administering and complying with the current system are largely incurred in determining a property's class life, not in computing depreciation allowances once that class life has been determined.
These cliffs and plateaus also are unnecessary. The current system could be modified to use class lives as recovery periods while allowing more accelerated methods (e.g., partial expensing) in order to maintain, at least on average, the current present value of depreciation allowances. 62 This system would avoid the problems in relative income measurement created by cliffs and plateaus. Any such reform would require Congressional action.
Difficulties in the Depreciation of Real Estate
Definition of a Building: The Section 1245/ Section 1250 Distinction As discussed above, the depreciation for section 1250 assets (e.g., buildings) is generally much slower than that for section 1245 assets (e.g., equipment). Thus, the classification of an asset, or its components, as a building (1250 asset) or as equipment (1245 asset) has important implications for its depreciation allowances. Yet the classification can be difficult, as the legal difference between 1245 and 1250 property is obscure. The Internal Revenue Code itself defines some special purpose buildings as 1245 property. 63 The tests used by the IRS and the courts to determine whether an asset is a building have changed over time, sometimes overturning earlier rulings and decisions. 64 The current standard used by the IRS and the courts in determining whether an asset is a building (a section 1250 asset) relies heavily on whether the asset is inherently permanent (deGanon, 1997) .
One subset of problems arises from the depreciation of assets without a class life. These are often new assets or assets that resemble buildings or their structural components. If classified as section 1245 property, property without a class life is depreciated over 7 years using the 200 percent declining balance method, while if classified as section 1250 property it would be depreciated over 39 years using the straight-line method. 61 This assumes that there is some correlation between economic life and class life. 62 The current alternative depreciation system uses class lives as recovery periods, but imposes the straight-line method. 63 See note 11. 64 Historically, the IRS has employed tests relating to the asset's function in determining whether it is a 1250 asset. If the asset functioned like a building, e.g., by providing an enclosed work environment, it was a building. Function tests have not been well received by courts, however, who have favored tests related to the asset's permanence (deGanon, 1997).
Modular buildings have no class life and so provide an example of the difficulty of making the section 1245/1250 determination in this case. 65 Since modular buildings are fairly easy to move, the permanence standard suggests that they may be section 1245 property. If so, they would be depreciated over 7 years using the 200 percent declining balance method. On the other hand, modular buildings serve the function of traditional buildings and also look like traditional buildings, and so resemble section 1250 property that is depreciated over 39 years using the straight-line method.
A priori it is not clear whether income measurement would be harmed if modular buildings were depreciated over 7 rather than 39 years. The answer depends on their rate of economic depreciation. It is clear, however, that taxpayers have a strong incentive to have modular buildings classified as 1245 property, while the IRS has an incentive to classify them as 1250 property, thereby engendering costly disputes and litigation.
The distinction between 1245 and 1250 property also is important when it is possible to separate some of a building's structural components from its shell in order to depreciate them separately as 1245 assets. Theoretically, the ability to make such separation is strictly limited under current law, since buildings are defined to include structural components such as wiring and plumbing in addition to their shell, walls, and roof (Reg. 1.48-1(e)(2)). The intent of the current system is to depreciate the entire composite asset, including all structural components, over 39 years using the straight-line method.
As a practical matter, however, often it is unclear whether many assets used in a building are structural components of the building. Recent court cases seem to allow substantial scope for segregation of many components (Hospital Corp. of America, 109 TC 21 Dec. 52, 163). For example, arguments can be advanced that electrical wiring and junction boxes used to power specialized equipment are 1245 property and therefore not considered a component of the building. In addition, some courts have maintained that a portion of the general purpose wiring in a building may be allocated to specialized equipment, and so may be a 1245 asset. Anecdotal evidence 66 suggests that taxpayers increasingly may be segregating building components and depreciating them under section 1245.
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Cost segregation has ambiguous implications for income measurement. These implications depend in part on whether components actually depreciate faster than the building shell, walls, and roof, and on whether the 39 year life is an appropriate average of a longer life for the shell, walls, and roof, and a shorter life for the segregated components.
Apart from income measurement issues, at a minimum the current situation imposes heavy compliance costs on taxpayers that seek to justify cost segregations, and imposes heavy monitoring costs on the IRS, who seeks to restrict such activities. The current situation also appears ripe for abuse and litigation.
Unfortunately, there is no easy way to fix the section 1245/1250 classification problem. Proper income measurement requires that depreciation allowances vary across assets, which requires in turn that particular expenditures be categorized for 65 purposes of determining depreciation allowances. Frictions, disputes and manipulation are unavoidable under any such system. They are part of the cost of measuring capital income. That said, one strategy would address the problem by reducing the section 1245/ 1250 distinction by redefining a building to include only the shell, roof, walls, and certain easily identified major structural components. An alternative would eliminate the section 1245/1250 distinction and depreciate buildings according to the taxpayer's general activity class. A third strategy would move in the opposite direction, and strictly limit the taxpayer's ability to segregate selective elements of a building's cost. These solutions all may involve revisiting class lives and recovery periods. While all might reduce taxpayer/ IRS disputes, it is unclear whether any would improve income measurement.
Improvements to Real Property 68
Following the logic of composite depreciation, additions or improvements to property are depreciated using the same recovery period that applies to the property itself. In contrast, repair expenditures may be deducted immediately. Accordingly, the distinction between repair expenditures and capital improvements is an important one.
In practice, however, it often is difficult to distinguish between repairs and improvements. Since all repairs extent the useful life of property, the distinction between repairs and capital improvements is one of degree and therefore is highly fact specific and potentially controversial.
Even when there is no doubt about capitalizing an expenditure, concern has been expressed as to the appropriateness of composite depreciation, especially for real property. According to this rule, replacement roofs, for example, are depreciated over 39 years even if such replacements must be made several times over the building's 39-year recovery period. The presumed inability to recognize a loss on the replaced component seemingly compounds the problem. 69 Taxpayers can find themselves depreciating several roofs, even though only a single roof exists on the building at one time.
The current treatment of replacements clearly can increase the compliance and enforcement costs of the tax system. This occurs because taxpayers must keep depreciation accounts for assets that no longer exist. It is less clear that the current system necessarily mismeasures income by inappropriately postponing deductions. This is an empirical question, the answer to which depends on whether a 39-year recovery period is an appropriate average for the life-cycle costs of the building.
A number of proposals have been advanced to accelerate cost recovery for improvements to real property. One proposal would establish a separate asset class for building improvements, presumably with a life far shorter than 39 years. Successful implementation would require that such improvements be easily identified and that a reasonable average class life could be found. Neither are foregone conclusions. The proposal also would raise difficult administrative issues as taxpayers may be tempted to shift construction costs into "improvements" that can be depreciated more rapidly.
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A second proposal would allow taxpayers to write-off the cost of abandoned components and improvements, such as 68 Similar problems accompany improvements and additions to personal property. 69 Proposed regulations under ACRS, the precursor to the current depreciation system, denied recognition of losses for structural components. There may be a question whether these proposed regulations apply under current law. 70 The proposal also may require revising upward the building's recovery period, to the extent that current law's recovery period reflects a life for major components that is shorter than 39 years.
roofs that have been replaced. Leasehold improvements currently receive this treatment. If administrable at low cost, this proposal may be justified. 71 In addition to possibly improving income measurement, it would eliminate the current distinction between leased properties and owneroccupied properties.
Finally, the building's class life might be reduced to account for improvements. This proposal may be the simplest to administer. Establishing an appropriate life may be difficult, however.
72 Nonetheless, even if not perfectly accurate, a shorter life may improve on current law to the extent that current law's recovery period fails to adequately account for improvements. This proposal, however, would not eliminate the distinction between leased and owner-occupied properties.
Is a 39 year Recovery Period Too Long for Nonresidential Real Estate?
Even setting aside problems related to improvements, taxpayers frequently object that the recovery period for real estate is too long.
73 Some empirical evidence supports this view. The present value calculations in Table 1 , for example, suggest that for many nonresidential structures, including industrial and commercial real estate, tax depreciation is slower than economic depreciation. Consequently, nonresidential structures face a marginal effective tax rate that exceeds that associated with economic depreciation, as confirmed in Table 3. 74 Assuming straightline depreciation, a 30-year recovery period would give nonresidential structures about the same marginal effective tax rate as implied by economic depreciation.
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While nonresidential structures receive depreciation allowances that are slow relative to economic depreciation, equipment's depreciation allowances are somewhat accelerated. Straight-line depreciation over 20 years 76 would give nonresidential structures about the same marginal effective tax rate as currently faced by equipment.
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These calculations rely on the HultenWykoff measures of economic depreciation. As discussed above these measures have been favorably reviewed recently. In addition, a recent study (Deloitte and Touche, 2000) obtains results roughly consistent with those of Hulten and Wykoff. This evidence further supports a shorter recovery period for nonresidential real estate.
Slowing the depreciation of equipment could pay for a shorter recovery period for real estate. In addition to having the virtue of a self-financed reform, this proposal also could improve the neutrality of the tax system for business property. The prospects for improved overall tax neutrality rise if the reform would not increase the marginal effective tax rate on business capital, relative to that of owner-occupied housing. 71 It also may require revising upward the building's recovery period, to the extent that the current life reflects a presumed inability to write-off these losses. 72 The required data on the life of various major building components may be difficult to obtain. Weighting the lifetimes of the components with that of the underlying structure also raises difficult issues even for a single type of building. Problems would be compounded in attempting to obtain an average for all buildings. 73 Indeed, this is a general complaint, but is more common and more pronounced for real estate. 74 These calculations assume that assets are held forever. They thus ignore asset sales that potentially affect conclusions about the taxation of real estate and other investments. 75 The exact straight-line recovery period depends on the particular assets being compared and on whether the investment is made in the corporate or the noncorporate sector. The calculation also is sensitive to the assumed (3 percent) inflation rate because economic depreciation is indexed while current tax depreciation is not indexed. A shorter straight-line recovery period would be required at higher inflation rates. An accelerated method over a constant or longer recovery period also could effect economic depreciation. 76 See the previous endnote. 77 Gravelle (1999) obtains a similar result.
Some factors, however, may argue against shortening real estate's recovery period. One is that buildings may appreciate in value over time. Giving more generous depreciation deductions, while continuing to allow gain on the building and associated land to benefit from deferral and from a reduced rate of tax, may strike some as inappropriate. Another is that current tax depreciation may reflect economic depreciation; the empirical evidence cited above may be wrong. The Committee Report on the 1993 bill that lengthened the life of structures to 39 years justified the increase as a way to match tax depreciation more closely to economic depreciation, although no supporting data or studies were cited (U.S. Congress, 1993) . Finally, buildings might enjoy a tax benefit from an ability to support relatively high leverage (Hines, 1987) . The increased tax benefit of debt finance might counteract to some degree the tax cost of decelerated depreciation. The tax benefit of high leverage would seem to be fairly small for noncorporate investors, however, and the argument that buildings are more heavily debt financed than other investments is controversial (Gravelle, 1985) .
CONCLUSION
The current cost recovery system is dated and perhaps in need of repair. It does not seem to effectively promote tax neutrality, nor does it effectively stimulate aggregate saving and investment. The MACRS system also faces administrative challenges; it contains a number of legal ambiguities that create uncertainties and inequities, and that lead to disputes between taxpayers and the IRS. Yet fixing the depreciation system will not be easy. Comprehensive reform (e.g., switching to economic depreciation) may not always be practicable, nor would it necessarily improve the functioning of the tax system. Reform from within, e.g., by modifying the current MACRS system, also faces challenges, some of which may be as serious as those faced if MACRS were abandoned in favor of another depreciation system. Nonetheless, the profound changes in the U.S. economy over the past 20 years and the prospect of future economic change may argue for addressing the shortcomings of the tax depreciation system.
